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On the Question of Aufhebung: Baudelaire, Bataille and Sartre

 
 
This essaǇ looks at “aƌtƌe͛s ƌatheƌ ŶastǇ ϭϵϰϯ essaǇ oŶ Bataille, ͞UŶ Ŷouǀeau ŵǇstiƋue,͟ aŶd the 
further argument between the two writers on Baudelaiƌe. “aƌtƌe aĐĐuses Bataille, iŶ the latteƌ͛s 
Inner Experience, of iŶtƌoduĐiŶg the ͞tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶt iŶto the iŵŵaŶeŶt͟; of eǆteƌŶaliziŶg the ego, 
such that human responsibility is elided; of leading, with its fascination with ritual, sacrifice and 
commuŶitǇ, to totalitaƌiaŶisŵ; of sǁalloǁiŶg up histoƌǇ. “aƌtƌe uses Hegel͛s ĐoŶĐept of Aufhebung 
from the Phenomenology as the focus of his critique: Bataille, Sartre argues, removes synthesis 
fƌoŵ Hegel͛s tƌiŶitǇ of thesis/aŶtithesis/sǇŶthesis ;Aufhebung) and puts tragedy in the place of the 
dialectic. This argument about the role of Aufhebung and the dialectic thus raises all the issues 
fundamental to what was to be called postmodernism: the role and sovereignty of subjectivity, 
the possibility of the sacred, the use of language, human freedom, the role of history in textual 
production, the individual as against the community, and the reasons for rejecting the possibility 
of a transcendental. 
Keywords: Aufhebung; Modernity; Postmodernity; Hegel; Baudelaire; Sartre; Bataille. 
 
For Ziva Ben-Porat 
 
OŶe of the ŵajoƌ sǇŵptoŵs of ŵodeƌŶitǇ aŶd ǁhat foƌ laĐk of a ďetteƌ teƌŵ ǁe Đall ͞post-
ŵodeƌŶitǇ͟ seeŵs to ďe a ƌapt ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁith ŶotioŶs of the dialeĐtiĐ.1 Left far behind is the 
usual triad of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Hegel, of course, is largely to be thanked for 
confusing things. In his Phenomenology, Hegel leaves things very murky by continually 
postponing synthesis (with the promise of eventual Geist, or spirit) and instead using the 
infamous term Aufhebung. From the German verb aufheben, the noun means to preserve or 
lift up. Thus the dialectic in Hegel is not synthesized, but continually lifted up to a new series 
of conflicting forces or antinomies. There lurks here a potential promise of sorts: preserving 
and lifting up a given dialectic into a new one belies a teleology of transcendence. Indeed, 
suĐh a goal is eǆpliĐit ǁith Hegel͛s Geist. The problem is, of course, that the dialectic 
becomes crucial for the likes of Marx, Feuerbach, Adorno, Benjamin and so on, where 
transcendence is at least overtly rejected. What is the implication of Aufhebung in such a 
context? Why does it become an issue in certain late modern/early postmodern texts? 
                                                 
 Article published in RCCS 75 (October 2006). 
1
 Versions of this essay have been presented in Portugal at the Universities of Coimbra, Lisbon and Porto. This 
essay has benefited enormously from the discussions that ensued. I wish to express here my gratitude to my 
generous hosts at all three institutions, and to thank as well the students who attended the lectures.  
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There is a remainder of sorts about the Aufhebung – something that needs closer 
examination. The Aufhebung, for example, is rejected by both Jean-Paul Sartre and his 
contemporary, Georges Bataille, but for very different reasons. Indeed, a close look at the 
argument between the two puts the Aufhebung at the center of the discordance. What is at 
stake, given what Aufhebung seems to promise, is the idea and place of transcendence. Such 
a notion is rejected by both Bataille and Sartre, at least on the face of it. Sartre because he is 
a Marxist and existentialist for whom transcendence smacks of religion. Bataille because life 
must be faced in the horror of the void. 
Bataille decides that in one important respect, he is like Baudelaire. Bataille believes that, 
like the poet, he wants what is understood as impossible: that is, he seeks a simultaneity of 
contrary experiences – hama, as Derrida reminds us that Aristotle puts it in the Anaximander 
FƌagŵeŶt. The ͚Ŷoǁ,͛ as Deƌƌida ĐoŶtiŶues to Ŷote iŶ the ǀoiĐe of Aƌistotle, ĐaŶŶot Đoeǆist 
ǁith aŶotheƌ Ŷoǁ. AŶd Ǉet this iŵpossiďle ͞Đo-mainteŶaŶĐe of seǀeƌal pƌeseŶt Ŷoǁs͟ 
(Derrida, 1982: 55) is what Baudelaire can be said to experience, and Bataille can certainly 
be said to seek. Baudelaire and Bataille will formulate antinomies whose co-existence is by 
definition impossible and yet irrevocable. They want the antinomies of the dialectic 
endlessly at discordance. Such a problem of logic is what Derrida (again) will call, with 
ƌespeĐt to Bataille, a ͞HegeliaŶisŵ ǁithout ƌeseƌǀe.͟ Bataille, Deƌƌida ŵaiŶtaiŶs iŶ that 
essaǇ, is Ŷot uŶdeƌgoiŶg ͞iŶŶeƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟ ;a ƌefeƌeŶĐe to Bataille͛s ďook of the saŵe titleͿ 
at all, ďut ƌatheƌ ͞the ͚iŵpossiďle͛͟ ǁhiĐh is a ͞toƌŵeŶt.͟ Theƌe is Ŷo iŶteƌioƌ foƌ the suďjeĐt 
in Bataille, Derrida continues, because there is no presence, only an impossible. And there is 
foƌ Bataille Ŷo eǆteƌioƌ, Deƌƌida ĐoŶtiŶues, eǆĐept ͞iŶ the ŵodes of ŶoŶ-relation, secrecy and 
ƌuptuƌe͟ ;Derrida, 1978: 272).2  
The attempt to maintain two nows is an impossible possibility whose name, says Derrida, 
is time. Such a gesture is what largelǇ ĐhaƌaĐteƌizes Bataille͛s pƌojeĐt, aŶd ǁhat ofteŶ 
ŵotiǀates Baudelaiƌe͛s as ǁell. IŶ ďoth, the histoƌiĐal situatioŶ ŵotiǀates a ǁilled Đƌisis – a 
rupture – and that crisis is evident in the impossible logic of antimony, or of two 
siŵultaŶeous ͞Ŷoǁs.͟ Bataille͛s aŶtiŵoŶies ĐoŶtiŶue aŶd eǆĐeed ;iŶ the distuƌďiŶg seŶse of 
the teƌŵͿ Baudelaiƌe͛s. “aƌtƌe of Đouƌse, liǀes iŶ the saŵe histoƌiĐal upheaǀal as Bataille; ďut 
                                                 
2
 “ee also MaƌtiŶ JaǇ͛s ƌeadiŶg ;ϮϬϬϱ: ϯϲϲ-381 ff), and particularly his discussion of the notion of experience in 
Bataille.  
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Sartre refuses to enter into the double vision of Baudelaire, or to give credence to Bataille͛s 
economy of excess. 
The triangulation Baudelaire-Sartre-Bataille, and the disagreements that ensue between 
the latter two provide, as I have noted, an opportunity for getting at a significant divergence 
in modernity, a divergence which begins with the Aufhebung and the role of antinomies. 
More importantly, however, this divergence marks not only differing notions of 
transcendence, history, the dialectic and so on. The deviation of opinion between Sartre and 
Bataille on these issues signals, I will argue, the place where postmodernity begins and takes 
leaǀe of aŶǇ ŵodeƌŶist, ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ thought ;like “aƌtƌe͛sͿ that ƌefuses to folloǁ. 
 
1. Baudelaire 
Baudelaire lives in a singular situation. The first modern poet to read the city as text, he 
inhabits the urban life in the time of high capitalism. The crowds of the city suddenly have a 
goal (to and from work; what the French call boulot-métro-dodo); Baudelaire as flâneur does 
not. He stands, in more ways than one, willfully outside the crowd, moving in nonchalant 
patterns (as against the goal-oriented flow of the crowd), enjoying an anonymity and 
isolatioŶ fƌoŵ the ŵasses. IŶ his essaǇ ͞Les Foules,͟ ;eĐhoiŶg Poe͛s ͞The MaŶ of the Cƌoǁd͟ 
ǁhiĐh Baudelaiƌe had just tƌaŶslatedͿ, he ǁƌites, ͞Multitude, solitude: eƋual and convertible 
teƌŵs foƌ the aĐtiǀe aŶd pƌoduĐtiǀe poet͟ ;1968: 243).3 Equal and convertible terms indeed, 
opposites though they may be. 
There are times when Baudelaire revels in such opposites, and plays lustily with what for 
other mere mortals is opeŶ ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶ. ͞Les Foules͟ is oŶe suĐh teǆt. Otheƌ teǆts, 
hoǁeǀeƌ, suĐh as ͞l͛Hoƌloge,͟ ƌail agaiŶst the ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶ of tiŵe, foƌ eǆaŵple, iŶ a ŵaŶŶeƌ 
that insists on its antinomies: time crushes by going slowly: three thousand six hundred 
times an houƌ, the seĐoŶd ǁhispeƌs, ͞‘eŵeŵďeƌ.͟ ͞Je suis Autƌefois͟ saǇs the ĐloĐk, aŶd 
adds ͞‘eŵeŵďeƌ͟ agaiŶ iŶ EŶglish, FƌeŶĐh aŶd “paŶish ;its ŵetal thƌoat, saǇs the poet, 
speaks all laŶguagesͿ. ‘eŵeŵďeƌ, the poet adds, ďeĐause ͞the aďǇss is alǁaǇs thiƌstǇ͟ aŶd 
͞it is too late͟ (ibid.: 76-77). Both realizations – the hideous slowness of time and, 
ĐoŶǀeƌselǇ, tiŵe͛s goŶe-in-a-flash quality – eǆist siŵultaŶeouslǇ foƌ the poet; tǁo ͞Ŷoǁs.͟ 
The very impossibility of their co-existence makes for the horror of time, and the force of the 
poeŵ. ;We ƌeŵeŵďeƌ Deƌƌida͛s poiŶt that to atteŵpt ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg tǁo Ŷoǁs is aŶ iŵpossiďle 
                                                 
3
 This and all other translations from Baudelaire are mine.  
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possibility whose name is time). In his Journaux intimes Baudelaiƌe ǁƌites, ͞At eǀeƌǇ ŵoŵeŶt 
ǁe aƌe Đƌushed ďǇ the idea aŶd seŶsatioŶ of tiŵe.͟ AŶd he adds, creating another 
oppositioŶ, ͞Theƌe aƌe oŶlǇ tǁo ǁaǇs of esĐapiŶg fƌoŵ this Ŷightŵaƌe – in order to forget it: 
pleasuƌe aŶd ǁoƌk. Pleasuƌe eǆhausts us. Woƌk stƌeŶgtheŶs us. Let us Đhoose͟ ;ibid.: 1266). 
The problem, however, as the life and texts of Baudelaire attest, is that the presence of two 
terms preclude choice. They are always, irrevocably, there. Or there is a choice which, as 
Georges Bataille makes clear, merely reinforces its opposite without annihilating the first term. 
There is an opposition in favor of Good, notes Bataille reading the poet, but it is an impossible 
resolution. He adds that Baudelaire chose God as he did Work, in a completely nominal way, 
͞iŶ oƌdeƌ to ďeloŶg to “ataŶ.͟ Baudelaiƌe Đould Ŷot deĐide, Bataille ĐoŶtiŶues, ͞ǁhether the 
opposition was his own, within himself (between pleasure and work) or external (between 
God aŶd the deǀilͿ.͟ ͞As a Đhild I felt iŶ ŵǇ heaƌt tǁo ĐoŶtƌadiĐtoƌǇ feeliŶgs,͟ ǁƌites Baudelaiƌe 
iŶ a passage that Bataille ǁill Đite, ͞the hoƌƌoƌ of life,͟ Baudelaiƌe ĐoŶtiŶues, ͞aŶd the eĐstasǇ 
of life͟ (Bataille, 1957: 42). AŶd theƌe is Baudelaiƌe͛s faŵous ƌeŵaƌk that ŵaŶ, at all tiŵes aŶd 
at every moment is possessed by two simultaneous postulations: one toward God, the other 
toward Satan. Bataille traces a triple series of antinomies here: between pleasure and work; 
between the Good and Satan; and a third coupling that encompasses the other two: the inner 
(work/pleasure) versus the outer (God/Satan). Baudelaire, Bataille tells us, is even unable to 
discern what is inner and what outer. 
It is not by accident that Bataille focuses on this particular problem in Baudelaire given 
that it is a problem he shares with the poet; indeed a problem in which Bataille will exceed 
Baudelaire. But let us look now to another point Bataille makes (which prepares the 
argument with Sartre): Baudelaire, writes Bataille, is living the relationship between 
pƌoduĐtioŶ aŶd eǆpeŶdituƌe iŶ histoƌǇ. Baudelaiƌe͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe is iŶ histoƌǇ, Ŷot iŶdiǀidual 
(Bataille, 1957: 42). The unparalleled teŶsioŶ ǁhiĐh I haǀe Ŷoted iŶ the poet͛s ǁoƌk, aŶd 
ǁhiĐh “aƌtƌe ĐoŵŵeŶts oŶ iŶ his oǁŶ ƌeadiŶg, is foƌ Bataille the ƌesult of ͞a material tension 
imposed historically, fƌoŵ ǁithout.͟ If Deƌƌida is ƌight, that theƌe is Ŷo iŶteƌioƌ foƌ the 
subject in Bataille except as non-relation, secrecy and rupture – then this might explain why 
Bataille reads opposition in Baudelaire as imposed by history, from without. But this cannot, 
as ǁe see, ďe a Đoŵplete eǆplaŶatioŶ. Foƌ Bataille is Đleaƌ that Baudelaiƌe͛s pƌoďlem is a 
society caught in a material tension of history. That society, like the individual, is forced to 
choose between the concerns for the future and the present instant. Bataille, having first 
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noted that Baudelaire does not know the difference between inner and outer in this context, 
decides that the poet does not realize that it is history that is pressing in upon him from the 
outside. The society around Les fleurs du mal is claiming success and satisfaction as the 
primary goals; capitalism is its credo. 
Baudelaire, however, is clearly dissatisfied with satisfaction.
4
 For to be useful is disgusting 
for Baudelaire, because it is the heart of the bourgeois ethos.
5
 Sartre notes complacently 
that to choose Evil is to uphold Good. Bataille complicates this approach: for Baudelaire, 
deŶial of the Good is, iŶ Bataille͛s ǁoƌds, a deŶial of the futuƌe aŶd theƌefoƌe aŶti-capitalism. 
The poet͛s sĐoƌŶ foƌ utilitaƌiaŶisŵ is a sǇllogisŵ of soƌts: to ďe useful is to ďe a good 
bourgeois who turns his back on the horrors of history (perpetrated by his own class) for the 
sake of a future dedicated to increasing wealth. Therefore, to refuse the Good in this sense, 
and to refuse the future, is to repudiate bourgeois morality and its hypocrisy. Evil becomes a 
better Good. 
The failed revolution of 1848 did much to create the irremediable presence of an 
impossible series of antimonies for Baudelaire. And Barthes (in Writing Degree Zero) is right 
that the teŶses ĐhoseŶ ďǇ fiĐtioŶ ǁƌiteƌs afteƌ ͛ϰϴ ďetƌaǇ, Ŷot oŶlǇ soĐial Đlass, ďut the 
ƌelatioŶ to histoƌǇ as ǁell. BeĐause if ͛ϰϴ did ŶothiŶg else, it iŶĐƌeased the eǆfoliatioŶ of Đlass 
ďeguŶ ďǇ the ͞ƌeal͟ ƌeǀolutioŶ of ϭϳϴϵ. It is this Ŷeǁ soĐietǇ that Baudelaiƌe had ǁaŶted to 
help shatteƌ; ͛ϰϴ ďuilt a Ŷeǁ ǁoƌld oŶ the fouŶdatioŶs of a complete bourgeois triumph, 
producing an anathema: a republic based (as Georges Sand was to put it) on the suppression 
and murder of the working class. The self-satisfaĐtioŶ of that Đlass iŶ the ǁake of ͛ϰϴ is thus 
unacceptable for ethical thinkers. Many writers of the period refuse, in other words, to 
forget. Bourgeois society, writes Bataille, introduces a fundamental change. And he adds, 
͞Fƌoŵ Chaƌles Baudelaiƌe͛s ďiƌth to his death,͟ Euƌope uŶdeƌgoes a ŵetaŵoƌphosis loŶg iŶ 
preparation. The civilized ǁoƌld is Ŷoǁ fouŶded ͞oŶ the pƌiŵaĐǇ of the ŵoƌƌoǁ, that is oŶ 
capitalist accumulation͟ (Bataille, 1957: 44). For those who, like Baudelaire, do not wish to 
follow, apathy, passivity and disillusionment (as Lukacs has amply pointed out) seem the 
inevitable choices. 
Baudelaiƌe͛s poetƌǇ posits aŶtiŶoŵies Ŷot oŶlǇ foƌ ĐoŵpelliŶg peƌsoŶal, ďiogƌaphiĐal 
reasons, then. The clashing of opposites in his work, the unredeemable (his word) 
                                                 
4
 Sartre, 1946. For a full discussion of this argument between Sartre and Bataille, seeMeltzer, 2002: 63-6 ff. 
5
 For a useful study of the complex class delineations in nineteenth-century France, see Jan Goldstein, 2005.  
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ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶs that ƌisk eǆplosioŶ at aŶǇ ŵoŵeŶt, aƌe ;to ƌetuƌŶ to Bataille͛s words), history 
pressing in. But where is in? The doubleness which Baudelaire traces in so many of his 
poems seems to trace as well the emptying out of subjectivity in the face of industrialization. 
͞EŵptǇiŶg out͟ suĐh that it is Ŷo loŶgeƌ Đleaƌ ǁheƌe ͞out͟ is eŵptǇiŶg from. In much of the 
poetƌǇ of Baudelaiƌe, ǁe see ͞up͟ aŶd ͞doǁŶ͟ ƌeplaĐiŶg iŶside aŶd outside. “uďjeĐtiǀitǇ, iŶ 
other words – at least the subject as he understood himself before revolution – has become 
a concept all unclear. 
The encounter itself in Baudelaire suffers from antinomy – whether it be that with the 
pooƌ ;ǁheƌe the gaze doŵiŶatesͿ, ǁith ďeautǇ ;as iŶ ͞HaƌŵoŶie du soiƌ͟Ϳ, ǁith the past 
;͞AŶdƌoŵaƋue, je peŶse à ǀous͟Ϳ; ǁith plaĐes dƌeaŵed of ďut Ŷeǀeƌ attaiŶed ;͞L͛iŶǀitatioŶ 
au voǇage͟Ϳ; eǀeŶ ǁith the diǀiŶe, as iŶ ͞CoƌƌespoŶdaŶĐes,͟ ǁheƌe ƌitual is ƌeiŶsĐƌiďed ďut 
the accent is on loss. And then there are, as I have noted, the eternal above and the endless 
below. So, for example, the world is a dictionary of hieroglyphics mirroring the higher realm, 
ďut ǁe ĐaŶŶot ƌead the diĐtioŶaƌǇ. The ͞joǇ of desĐeŶt,͟ as Baudelaiƌe puts it, leads to the 
gouffre (the abyss), le néant (nothingness), le vide (emptiness) – a terrifying vide of 
bottomless promise. 
The point here is not to enter into the infamous binaries that have so motivated 
deconstructive and other critical theories in the last decades – binaries which, as Levinas has 
often noted, lead only to changing positions and collapsing the same into the same. On the 
contrary: my point is to affiƌŵ that Baudelaiƌe͛s oppositioŶs aƌe iƌƌedeeŵaďle ďeĐause this is 
his way of experiencing modernity and its Weltsraum. The strident tension, the mental 
aŶguish aŶd ĐaĐophoŶǇ ǁhiĐh the pƌeseŶĐe of tǁo opposiŶg ͞Ŷoǁ͛s͟ Đause the poet, aƌe 
frequently desĐƌiďed aŶd eǆpeƌieŶĐed ďǇ hiŵ as a Ŷeed foƌ ƌuptuƌe. ͞AŶǇǁheƌe out of the 
ǁoƌld,͟ he pleads iŶ aŶ EŶglish title. ͞I ǁill aĐĐept eǀeŶ death if it is soŵethiŶg at least new,͟ 
he writes in a prose poem. 
If for Walter Benjamin, the Fleurs du mal registers a breakdown, the loss of aura and the 
ensuing shock, for Baudelaire himself modernity is comprised of the eternal and the fleeting 
at the same time. OŶe thiŶks, foƌ eǆaŵple, of the faŵous poeŵ ͞A uŶe passaŶte,͟ iŶ ǁhiĐh a 
passing woman in mourning fleetingly ŵeets the poet͛s gaze ;iŶ a ŵoŵeŶt ĐoŶĐƌetiziŶg 
epiphany, since it is produced by the illumination of a lightening bolt) (Baudelaire, 1968: 88). 
It is a busy city street, and she is part of the crowd, he is the observing flâneur. The poem 
ends, famously, with the ǁoƌds, ͞O toi Ƌue j͛eusse aiŵĠe, ô toi Ƌui le saǀais!͟ AŶ alǁaǇs-too-
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late, because the eternal is never begun, only as if remembered. Halfway between Pascal 
(with his two infinities) and Kierkegaard (with his notion of trembling), in Baudelaire the 
poetic subject is overwhelmed by the empty parts of the city under demolition which seem 
to echo the absence of God, the irrevocability of evil, the resulting failure of encounter. 
CoŶtƌadiĐtioŶ is Baudelaiƌe͛s dutǇ, aŶd eǆplosiǀe laughteƌ eƌupts fƌoŵ hiŵ, as he puts it, 
͞ǁithout a sŵile.͟ ͞Theƌe is alǁaǇs soŵethiŶg ǁhiĐh ďƌeaks, ǁhiĐh destƌoǇs itself,͟ he ǁƌites 
in one of his journals. The antinomies are preserved and forced together to the point of 
atomic fission, for in Baudelaire the contradictions of modernity are inscribed in every 
conceivable realm: social, political, literary, aesthetic, architectural, personal, philological, 
technological (the daguerreotype, with its prolonged staring, writes the poet, destroys the 
gaze); theological (what is origiŶal siŶ if Ŷot the pƌoof of ŵaŶ͛s ŵiseƌǇ aŶd gƌaŶdeuƌ foƌ the 
poet?), ontological – the list is eŶdless. ModeƌŶitǇ is pƌeĐiselǇ the pƌeseŶĐe of tǁo ͞Ŷoǁ͛s͟ 
at the same time – an impossibility which memory and the present, like the double room, 
force into aŶ eŶdless paliŵpsest of ƌeĐuƌƌeŶĐe ;like the eagle eatiŶg Pƌoŵetheus͛s liǀeƌ, 
which regenerates eternally). Moreover, the co-maintenance of antinomies is what blurs the 
understanding of where the borders of subjectivity lie for Baudelaire: where is inside and 
where outside when the very terms co-exist in a constant state of destabilization? What 
does it mean to turn the subject inside out onto the modern city, a city that is under 
constant construction? This might be called both the willed project and the tragedy of 
Baudelaire. It is in this sense that history presses in on him. 
The uŶsatisfaĐtoƌǇ foƌ Baudelaiƌe is theŶ ͞agoŶiziŶglǇ attƌaĐtiǀe͟ – satisfying, in other 
words. The refusal to work is validated by what both Bataille and Sartre understand as the 
͞tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶĐe of oďligatioŶ.͟ But Bataille aƌgues, contra Sartre, that this is not an 
individual error in Baudelaire. Sartre, writes Bataille, thinks he has successfully condemned 
Baudelaiƌe, aŶd shoǁŶ the ͞pueƌile͟ aspeĐt of his attitude (Bataille, 1957: 161). Sartre thinks 
Baudelaiƌe͛s pƌoďleŵs ĐaŶ ďe eǆplaiŶed ďǇ the death of his fatheƌ ǁheŶ the poet ǁas siǆ; ďǇ 
his ŵotheƌ͛s ƌeŵaƌƌiage to a ŵaŶ Baudelaiƌe loathed; ďǇ the eŶsuiŶg loss of his adoƌed 
ŵotheƌ. “aƌtƌe͛s ďook-long introduction to Baudelaire, Bataille notes tersely, is less the work 
of a ĐƌitiĐ thaŶ it is that of a ͞ŵoƌal judge, to ǁhoŵ it is iŵpoƌtaŶt to kŶoǁ aŶd affiƌŵ that 
Baudelaiƌe is to ďe ĐoŶdeŵŶed͟ (ibid.: 163). Baudelaire, Sartre has concluded in his 
judgŵeŶt, Đhose to ͞eǆist foƌ hiŵself as he ǁas foƌ otheƌs.͟ Baudelaiƌe Đhooses the ŶotioŶ of 
his oǁŶ ͞Ŷatuƌe,͟ aŶd afteƌ that giǀes up liďeƌtǇ. He is theƌefoƌe, iŶ “aƌtƌeaŶ teƌŵs, 
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inauthentic. It is to be noted here that much of what Sartre finds to condemn in Baudelaire 
he will also condemn in Bataille. 
Bataille ƌetoƌts ǁith ǀigoƌ to “aƌtƌe͛s aŶalǇsis: the uŶpaƌalleled teŶsioŶ iŶ the poet͛s ǁoƌk, 
aŶd ͞the fullŶess ǁith ǁhiĐh [it] has iŶǀaded the ŵodeƌŶ ŵiŶd,͟ Bataille ǁƌites, ĐaŶŶot ďe 
eǆplaiŶed ďǇ his peƌsoŶal eƌƌoƌs, ďut ďǇ ͞the histoƌiĐally determined expectation to which 
these eƌƌoƌs ĐoƌƌespoŶded͟ (ibid.: 42). It is not only individual necessity which is expressed in 
Les fleurs du mal; the poems themselves are also the result, as we have noted, of pressure 
from without (ibid.: 43). To wit: the poems were written in a society which no longer 
sustained the primacy of the future in conjunction with a nominal, sacred present (through 
what Bataille calls festivity: feasts, sacrifices, an immutable notion of the Good). The new 
society forming in Baudelaiƌe͛s daǇ is ͞a Đapitalist soĐietǇ iŶ full sǁiŶg,͟ oŶe ǁhiĐh Đhooses 
the dams of the industrial age over the lakes of Versailles (and similarly has Haussman build 
boulevards in Paris to insure against the barricades of the future). If the present has no 
sacred, it is because its only purpose is to pave the way to the future.  
There is an irony here, of course. Bataille, the anarchist of sorts, the economist of excess, 
the theoretician of violence, scholar and self-proclaimed practitioner of sacrifice – Bataille 
hypostatizes rupture in Baudelaire as caused by a historical situation: capitalist culture 
destroys the aŶĐieŶ régiŵe’s sense of time and memory, and makes productivity its sole 
virtue. Sartre, the Marxist (still, in this period) who does not believe in the Freudian 
unconscious, explains Baudelaire on biographical, psychological grounds and condemns him 
on existential ones. 
For Bataille then, it is the tension in French society around 1848 which mirrors the 
tension within the poet. We can call this an identification of sorts; Bataille will have the same 
response to the cataclysmic events in his own day. In the wake of such political and social 
upheaǀal, ǁheƌe does the ͞iŶside͟ of the suďjeĐt lie? Hoǁ ĐaŶ he kŶoǁ? Paƌt of the 
response, I am arguing, in Baudelaire at least, is to echo the external chaos in a poetry and 
poetics of antinomy. Here too, Bataille identifies. Indeed, the epigraph for his response to 
“aƌtƌe oŶ Baudelaiƌe ŵakes aŶ oŶtologǇ of aŶtiŶoŵǇ, as it ǁeƌe, fuŶdaŵeŶtal: ͞MaŶ ĐaŶŶot 
loǀe hiŵself ĐoŵpletelǇ uŶless he ĐoŶdeŵŶs hiŵself.͟6 The definition of man for Sartre is 
he-who-seeks-liberty in a moral, existential universe; he who is condemned to be free. For 
Bataille, man is defined by a submission to an interdiction, and the simultaneous insistence 
                                                 
6
 ͞L͛Hoŵŵe Ŷe peut s͛aiŵeƌ jusƋu͛au ďout s͛il Ŷe se ĐoŶdaŵŶe͟ (Bataille, 1957: 27). 
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upoŶ tƌaŶsgƌessioŶ. “aƌtƌe is ͞Đlosed to this tƌuth͟; Bataille, like Baudelaiƌe, is ĐoŶǀiŶĐed ďǇ it 
(Bataille, 1957: 161). Already, then, we see the difference between Bataille and Sartre in the 
notion of morality, of the very definition of the human, and in antimony as the unacceptable 
(Sartre) and the indispensable (Bataille). 
 
2. Sartre’s experience of Inner Experience 
“aƌtƌe ƌeǀieǁed Bataille͛s Inner Experience in February 1943, in Cahiers du sud.7 It is 
forty-five pages long, which is a rather lengthy manner of calling a book bad. The review has 
ďeeŶ ƌeĐeŶtlǇ Đalled a ͞gƌeat liteƌaƌǇ ŵisuŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg,͟ iŶ the tƌaditioŶ foƌ eǆaŵple of 
Gide͛s failuƌe to ƌeĐogŶize Pƌoust͛s geŶius, oƌ BalzaĐ͛s ŵisjudgŵeŶt of “teŶdhal.8 But ͞gƌeat 
literary ŵisuŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͟ is Ŷot Ƌuite aĐĐuƌate, foƌ “aƌtƌe͛s ƌeǀieǁ is liteƌaƌǇ oŶlǇ iŶ its 
initial concerns, and a misunderstanding only if that term is equated with something like the 
will-not-to-kŶoǁ ;ǁhiĐh, it ǁill ďe ƌeŵeŵďeƌed, is a ŶotioŶ of NietzsĐhe͛sͿ. The debate is 
first to do with philosophy: with the role of literature in the academy and the ensuing 
assuŵptioŶs aďout kŶoǁledge. It is as ǁell, seĐoŶdlǇ, a fleǆiŶg of “aƌtƌe͛s positioŶ of 
eǆpeƌtise: ͞MoŶsieuƌ Bataille͟ ;as “aƌtƌe ĐoŶsisteŶtlǇ ƌefeƌs to him) does not understand 
Jaspers and is confused about Heidegger. He uses ipseity wrong because he reads Heidegger 
iŶ CoƌďiŶ͛s tƌaŶslatioŶ. IŶdeed, Bataille ͞Ŷe ĐoŵpƌeŶd pas la philosophie͟ (Sartre, 1947: 
156). Thirdly, the review is an argument about language. For Sartre language remains an 
instrument—useful, reliable, cooperative. Alain (philosopher and famed teacher – of Simone 
Weil, e.g.) – AlaiŶ, ǁƌites “aƌtƌe, is aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ philosopheƌ ǁho ͞has 
ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ ǁoƌds͟ (ibid.: 148). What is Bataille doiŶg ǁith his ͞slippeƌǇ seŶteŶĐes͟ aŶd 
mixtures of poetry and prose? 
Bataille is the heiƌ of Baudelaiƌe aŶd MallaƌŵĠ iŶ that Bataille͛s teǆts tƌǇ to eǆĐeed 
language itself and constantly remark on the irony of using language to describe its 
ineluctable insufficiency. Sartre, a rationalist in this area, is more baffled than admiring. For 
                                                 
7
 The teǆt, ͞UŶ Ŷouǀeau ŵǇstiƋue,͟ is ƌepƌiŶted iŶ JeaŶ-Paul Sartre, Situations I (1947). 
8
 See, e.g. Heimonet, 1996: 59-73. CaƌoliŶe BliŶdeƌ has Ŷoted that “aƌtƌe͛s ĐƌitiƋue of Bataille iŶ ƋuestioŶ heƌe 
͞paƌadoǆiĐallǇ ƌepeats aŶd ƌedefiŶes itself iŶ Bataille͛s ͚La Moƌale de Milleƌ͛͟ ;BliŶdeƌ, uŶpuďlished ŵs.Ϳ. 
Bataille ǁas a ŵeŵďeƌ of HeŶƌǇ Milleƌ͛s ͞DefeŶse Coŵŵittee,͟ fightiŶg to pƌoteĐt Milleƌ fƌoŵ the legal aĐtioŶ 
threatened in 1946 by Daniel Parker, the self-pƌoĐlaiŵed PƌesideŶt of the ͞Caƌtel d͛aĐtioŶs soĐials et ŵoƌales.͟ 
Parker wanted to charge Miller with obscenity for Tropic of Cancer, Tropic of Capricorn and Black Spring. 
Bataille wrote an essay in the first issue of Critique, ǁhiĐh he fouŶded, oŶ the ͞Affaiƌe Milleƌ.͟ BliŶdeƌ ƌightlǇ 
Ŷotes that Bataille͛s essaǇ oŶ Milleƌ is iŶ faĐt a ĐoŶtiŶuatioŶ of his disagreement with Sartre over the role of 
liteƌatuƌe; a disagƌeeŵeŶt ǁhiĐh ďegiŶs ǁith “aƌtƌe͛s ͞UŶ Ŷouǀeau ŵǇstiƋue.͟ “ee espeĐiallǇ AŵǇ HollǇǁood͛s 
eǆĐelleŶt disĐussioŶ of ͞UŶ Ŷouǀeau ŵǇstiƋue,͟ iŶ heƌ Sensible Ecstasy (2002: 29-35 ff). 
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hiŵ, as he ŵakes Ƌuite Đleaƌ iŶ ͞UŶ Ŷouǀeau ŵǇstiƋue,͟ laŶguage is a tool to ďe hoŶed, to 
be well-marshaled (adequate, rational, etc.). Though Sartre situates Bataille͛s ǁoƌk iŶ the 
tƌaditioŶ of the essaǇ, ǁith PasĐal aŶd MoŶtaigŶe, Bataille͛s use of laŶguage is foƌ “aƌtƌe 
ŶothiŶg less thaŶ a hoƌƌoƌ: ͞OŶe guesses,͟ he ǁƌites of Bataille͛s stǇle, ͞that this plastiĐ, 
fused matter, with its abrupt solidifications which liquefy as soon as one touches them […] 
Đould Ŷot ďe aĐĐoŵŵodated to oƌdiŶaƌǇ laŶguage.͟ Oƌ: ͞the stǇle pƌogƌesses ďǇ stƌaŶgliŶg 
itself, tǇiŶg itself iŶto kŶots͟ (ibid.: 146). Bataille writes by sacrificing words as bloodily as 
possible, adds Sartre in some disbelief, and he shares with Camus a hatred of discourse and 
of language. It is no wonder, then, that Sartre alludes admiringly, and with relief, to Voltaire 
– the doyen of linguistic clarity and ease. 
FouƌthlǇ aŶd aďoǀe all, hoǁeǀeƌ, “aƌtƌe͛s ƌeǀieǁ is aŶ attaĐk oŶ Bataille͛s iŶteƌest iŶ the 
sacred. Yes, writes Sartre, Bataille agrees with Nietzsche that God is dead. But not only has 
Bataille survived the death of God, God himself has somehow survived his own death as 
well. At least, that is how Sartre sees it. Bataille says he is trying to create a new religion 
without a god, but Sartre smells a rat: God, as Simone Weil was to put it, is hiding behind the 
furniture. 
This ďƌiŶgs us to the ŶotioŶ of the saĐƌed, ǁhiĐh lies at the heaƌt of “aƌtƌe͛s pƌoďleŵ with 
Bataille. In his later essay on Manet (1955), Bataille gives his definition of the sacred. It is 
͞that ǁhiĐh, ďeiŶg oŶlǇ ďeǇoŶd ŵeaŶiŶg, is ŵoƌe thaŶ ŵeaŶiŶg.͟ What Bataille sees iŶ 
MaŶet͛s paiŶtiŶgs is the ͞shipǁƌeĐk of the suďjeĐt͟ – that moment when subjectivity is killed 
(Bataille, 1983: 69). But, as Michel Surya points out in his remarkable biography of Bataille, 
what interests Bataille is not so much the dead subject as the subject in the process of 
disappearing. In the words of Surya, the having-been-put-to-death of the subject fascinates 
Bataille more than its proclaimed death (as that which is finished). Bataille wants a haunting, 
the liminality of death at its moment of occurrence (Surya, 2002: 471-72). And so Sartre is 
right: God subsists as a haunting in Bataille. But Bataille wants this haunting, this ghost of 
death after death itself; Sartre does not, for he sees in it nothing more than the 
transcendental returned through the back door. 
For Bataille, the force of the sacred, the heterogeneous, is fundamental to all social life. 
The ͞ƌeligious͟ has ďeeŶ laƌgelǇ foƌgotteŶ aŶd Ŷeeds ďǇ sĐieŶtifiĐ ŵethod ;the iŶflueŶĐe 
heƌe is of Đouƌse DuƌkheiŵͿ to ďe ƌeiŶstated. Foƌ “aƌtƌe, this is Bataille͛s ďiggest eƌƌoƌ: to 
imagine studying an unknowable negativity by means of a scientific method, and in the 
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names of Durkheim and Mauss! Durkheim, writes Sartre, is surely rolling over in his grave. 
AŶd heƌe peƌhaps ǁe ĐaŶ get at the heaƌt of the ŵatteƌ. Bataille͛s ŶotioŶ of the saĐƌed is 
akin to the vanishing of the subject, to the break as he sees it in representation itself, to the 
absent-presence (as we used to say) of an already-dead God, to that which can bring being 
beyond meaning and beyond subjectivity. And Sartre? Significantly, when Sartre calls his 
book Saint Genet, he is doiŶg ŵoƌe thaŶ eǀokiŶg the plaǇ ͞The Tƌue “aiŶt GeŶet͟ ďǇ ‘otƌou 
(1646). As there is a sacred for Bataille, there is sainthood for Sartre. But what is meant by 
͞saiŶt͟ foƌ “aƌtƌe is ŵost ƌeǀealiŶg. OďǀiouslǇ, he ĐaŶŶot ŵeaŶ it iŶ any but an atheistic 
seŶse. BǇ ͞saiŶt,͟ “aƌtƌe ŵeaŶs that GeŶet is a paƌiah, ďut oŶe ǁho assuŵes his eǆĐlusioŶ; 
takes a glorious responsibility for it. Genet behaves against the norm and against convention 
(that world which Sartre calls that of the salauds). 
There lurks a double-edged meaning when Sartre refers to Inner Experience as a ͞ŵaƌtǇƌ 
essaǇ.͟ OŶ the oŶe haŶd, he faults Bataille foƌ a stǇle ǁhiĐh has Ǉet to fiŶd itself ďut is ƌife 
with agony, hideous passion, narrative promiscuity, and a hatred of disĐouƌse. ͞Look at ŵǇ 
ulĐeƌs aŶd ǁouŶds,͟ the essaǇ seeŵs to saǇ. OŶ the otheƌ haŶd, Bataille is iŶ ŵaŶǇ ǁaǇs 
himself a pariah and, like Genet, against bourgeois norm and convention.
9
 Religious 
teƌŵiŶologǇ ŵultiplies iŶ “aƌtƌe͛s leǆiĐoŶ heƌe. Inner Experience, he notes sardonically, reads 
like a ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of the Gospels aŶd Baudelaiƌe͛s ͞l͛IŶǀitatioŶ au ǀoǇage.͟ A ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ, 
oŶe assuŵes “aƌtƌe ŵeaŶs, of ĐoŶǀeǇiŶg ͞The Tƌuth͟ aŶd faŶtasiziŶg aďout a ǀoǇage of 
exotic/erotic possibilities that will clearly never be undertaken. And so, of course, Bataille is 
the founder of a new mysticism. 
GeŶet, iŶ ĐoŶtƌast, is a ͞saiŶt͟ foƌ “aƌtƌe: he is the paƌiah, the oŶe ǁho is eǆĐluded ďǇ 
society. We note here the opposing symmetry between Sartre and Bataille (though the latter 
ĐoŶsideƌed “aƌtƌe͛s Saint Genet his greatest work). For Bataille, the sacred is that which is 
transubjective, which celebrates in fact the disappearance of the subject in a transcendence 
of silence, as Sartre calls it. For Sartre on the other hand, sainthood is precisely that 
singularity which, authentic, assumes responsibility for its own history and at the same time 
chooses (in this case) crime. It is not because Genet was inevitably led to crime that he 
chooses a life of crime, notes Sartre: pre-deteƌŵiŶisŵ, Ŷo ŵatteƌ the Đause, eƌases ŵaŶ͛s 
                                                 
9
 But as Surya and others remind us, Bataille frequently published under pseudonyms and felt that his 
reputation as an archivist of medieval manuscripts at the Bibliothèque Nationale had to be protected. But 
there are of course also more metaphysical reasons: Bataille wanted to write in order to erase his name. See 
Surya, 2002: 88-92.  
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liďeƌtǇ aŶd his siŶgulaƌitǇ. MeaŶǁhile, it is pƌeĐiselǇ suĐh ͞eƌasuƌe͟ that Bataille seeks. This is 
a fundamental difference in the notion of being between the two. 
Finally, however, things are even more serious. If Bataille, as “aƌtƌe puts it, ǁaŶts ͞to eǆist 
ĐoŵpletelǇ aŶd iŶstaŶtlǇ͟ ;tout entier et tout de suite), it must be because for Bataille there 
is no possibility (even if there were a point) of choosing, no freedom for creating essence. 
This is because Bataille is unable to understand that the ego (le moi) is temporal, that it 
needs time to realize itself. In vain does Bataille tell us that the ego is in shreds, comprised of 
iŶstaŶts, ǁƌites “aƌtƌe. He ĐoŶĐludes: ͞foƌ the tiŵe of iŶteƌioƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe is not made up of 
iŶstaŶts.͟ No douďt “aƌtƌe is iŶ paƌt ƌespoŶdiŶg to a ǁell-intended footnote by Bataille in his 
aƌtiĐle eŶtitled, as it happeŶs, ͞The “aĐƌed͟ (Bataille, 1985). There Bataille writes of Sufi 
mysticism as describing the dangerous power of instants: they are like swords, cutting at the 
ƌoots of ďoth the futuƌe aŶd past. ͞the ŵoƌal ĐhaƌaĐteƌ of the saĐƌed is ƌefleĐted iŶ this 
ǀioleŶt ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ,͟ Ŷotes Bataille (ibid.: 245). Having elided mysticism, the sacred and 
the instant, Bataille then moves to Sartre for his example: La Nausée speaks of the 
iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of the iŶstaŶt ͞iŶ a sigŶifiĐaŶt ǁaǇ.͟ “aƌtƌe ĐaŶŶot haǀe ďeeŶ happǇ ǁith this 
interpretation, for it allies him with the erasure of history. (Of course we know that Sartre 
later rejected ŵuĐh of his oǁŶ Ŷoǀel…Ϳ ͞UŶ Ŷouǀeau ŵǇstiƋue͟ pƌoǀides “aƌtƌe ǁith aŶ 
occasion to articulate his position with respect to what are for him three areas worthy, at 
the very least, of extreme suspicion: mysticism, the sacred and the instant. They all smell, of 
course, of the transcendental. 
“aƌtƌe͛s ĐoŶĐlusioŶ is as ĐoŶdesĐeŶdiŶg as ǁas the opeŶiŶg of his ƌeǀieǁ: At the outset, 
he wonders if the whole of Inner Experience is no more than a long commentary on Maurice 
BlaŶĐhot͛s Thoŵas l’oďsĐur, as Camus had suggested to Sartre. At the end he decides that 
Bataille needs serious psychoanalysis – but not, he hastens to add, of the Freudian variety. 
Despite this dismissive ending, there is a great deal at stake here: Monsieur Bataille, Sartre 
concludes, introduces the transcendental into the immanent – not a minor point. Two 
further issues are equally at issue: first, the notion of subjectivity; second, the danger 
Bataille͛s uŶiǀeƌsaliziŶg thought poses to histoƌiĐitǇ. As to the fiƌst ;the suďjeĐtͿ, ǁe haǀe 
noted that foƌ “aƌtƌe Bataille͛s pƌoďleŵ is that he uŶdeƌstaŶds the ego as aŶ eǆteƌŶal oďjeĐt, 
as something that does not belong to the subject. (This is also, one might note, the reproach 
Sartre makes of the Freudian unconscious). It is worth noting therefore, that we see in Sartre 
a certain tenacity with respect to the singularity of the individual. As to the second issue, the 
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daŶgeƌ of this kiŶd of ŵǇstiĐal thiŶkiŶg, “aƌtƌe is Đleaƌ. Bataille͛s thought is totalitaƌiaŶ 
because it is not analytic and because it swallows up history. It is inauthentic because it 
proclaims the death of God but refuses atheism. Most importantly for our purposes here, 
Bataille (says Sartre) considers man himself an irresolvable contradiction (Sartre, 1947: 154). 
Bataille thus follows the footsteps of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Jaspers in believing that 
some conflicts cannot be solved. He therefore removes synthesis from the Hegelian trinity, 
says Sartre, and substitutes tragedy for the dialectic. Why tragedy? Because Bataille wants, 
in faĐt, tǁo Ŷoǁs: he ͞takes upoŶ hiŵself tǁo ĐoŶtƌadiĐtoƌǇ poiŶts of ǀieǁ siŵultaŶeouslǇ͟ 
(ibid.: 162). 
With Bataille, the antinomies move dangerously even closer – indeed, one might say that 
they are forced into confrontation. In Baudelaire, we see the ecstasy of poetry and the abyss 
of spleen – a stance which produces, as Jean-Pierre Richard has noted, two abysses (the sky 
aŶd the depthsͿ. These aƌe siŵultaŶeous, ďattliŶg foƌĐes iŶ the poet͛s soul. Wheƌeas 
Baudelaiƌe ǀests the Đlash of aŶtiŶoŵies iŶ the poet͛s psyche, Bataille inscribes contradictory 
foƌĐes oŶ the ďodǇ. Foƌ eǆaŵple, his iŶfaŵous ͞piŶeal eǇe,͟ the slit oŶ the top of eǀeƌǇ 
huŵaŶ͛s head. This slit is the sĐopiĐ aŶd ŵeŶtal aŶalog of the aŶus, aŶd Bataille Đalls it ͞the 
jesuǀe͟ ;a ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ, aŵoŶg otheƌ thiŶgs, of Jesu, Vesuǀius, aŶd ͞Je͟Ϳ ;Bataille, 1985: 
73-78Ϳ. It is the ŵaŶifestatioŶ, aŶd Ŷot the sǇŶthesis, of Bataille͛s ǀioleŶt aŶtiŶoŵies. 
The sun – a central image in Bataille – also insists on antinomy. The sun gives light and 
sight. But the same sun also blinds if looked at directly and destroys life (rotting corpses, 
notes Bataille). And if Baudelaire is obsessed by the eyes of the poor, their gaze, Bataille is 
faŵouslǇ oďsessed ǁith ͞the eǇe͟ tout court. His blind, syphilitic father clearly inspired the 
emphasis on the pineal eye, the slit eye, the Story of the Eye, and so on. Yet we need not 
perform the error on Bataille that he believed Sartre was committing on Baudelaire: like that 
poet, Bataille͛s ǁoƌk too is iŵpƌiŶted ďǇ the pƌessuƌe of history and is not purely the result 
of a single mind and its psychology. 
It might be well to recall here that Bataille attended the Kojève seminars on Hegel in the 
1930s (and Sartre, unlike most intellectuals of the day, did not). Bataille wrote several essays 
analyzing the dialectic. Whereas he was strongly Hegelian in 1937, by 1944 he was willfully 
less so. HistoƌǇ, ǁe ĐaŶ agƌee, iŶteƌǀeŶed. CleaƌlǇ affeĐted ďǇ Kojğǀe͛s ƌeadiŶg, Bataille 
comes to believe that the Hegelian dialectic begins with the struggle for recognition, and 
remains too much within it. What becomes an issue for Bataille is the status of negativity 
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within the dialectic. What can be the recognition of negativity, when radical otherness is 
continually elided? As Bataille, puts it, Minerva͛s oǁl aƌƌiǀes ǁheŶ Ŷight has falleŶ; so too, 
the philosopher always arrives when it is too late.  
Like Baudelaire, then, for Bataille it is always already too late. It is as if the political and 
conceptual upheaval that is modernity, with its wars of technology, have produced an 
always already which is still too late in coming. If Hegel saw Napoleon as the Zeitgeist on 
horseback, Baudelaire has no heroes except at times Satan and Lucifer. Bataille, as Caillois 
was to note, has only Satan; he has lost even Lucifer.  
For what lacks in the modern world for Bataille is the sacred – not the sacred of organized 
religion, but a sacred having to do with ritual and communion. Until the late thirties, Bataille 
genuinely believed that the societies he created, secret and public, could reinstate a sense of 
the sacred and of community in modern life. With the war, and with the beginnings of his 
illness however, he becomes disillusioned. Modernity is such that everyday life cannot be 
resacralized. Whereas Benjamin will posit shoĐk as the ƌeĐogŶitioŶ of the auƌa͛s deŵise 
under modernity, Bataille chooses to express the loss through the more violent juxtaposition 
of ǁilled aŶd siŵultaŶeous ͞Ŷoǁ͛s͟; of the iŶĐoŵpatiďle. ‘ogeƌ Caillois Đalled this Bataille͛s 
will to tragedy (NietzsĐheaŶ allusioŶ iŶteŶdedͿ, aŶd iŶ this Callois agƌeed ǁith “aƌtƌe͛s 
assessment. 
* * * * *  
Bataille͛s Ƌuest foƌ ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ, foƌ that ǁhiĐh puts the suďjeĐt itself at ƌisk, foƌ ƌuptuƌe – 
these are aspects of a new thought for Sartre. He understands such thought as a sneaky 
reinscription of Aufhebung, and rejects it as such. The apparent ease with which Sartre 
rejects Inner Experience may in fact betray, in light of his subsequent work, a temptation 
toward the very transcendent tendencies of which he accuses Bataille. To reject the 
Aufhebung, after all, is a different proposition. In any case, Sartre will maintain (to the end of 
his life) an ardent belief in human freedom, in the usefulness of language, in human choice, 
ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ, aŶd siŶgulaƌitǇ. ͞UŶ Ŷouǀeau ŵǇstiƋue,͟ theŶ, ŵaǇ ďe seeŶ as a seŵiŶal teǆt 
marking the fork in the road between modernism and its heir: a postmodernism impatient 
with any sovereign subject and suspicious if not dismissive of any notion of human freedom. 
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